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The Non-neutral Employer and Section 10(k)
of the National Labor Relations Act
In Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB' the District of Columbia Circuit held that
Section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act 2 precludes the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) from determining the merits of jurisdic-
tional strikes3 when competing unions have agreed on a method for voluntary
settlement. This decision, in effect, substitutes the Joint Board of the AFL-
CIO (Joint Board) I for the NLRB in resolving jurisdictional strikes when the
employer involved is not a signatory of the Joint Board Agreement. The
court in Plasterers rejected twenty years of NLRB precedent, i.e., that the
employer involved in a jurisdictional strike was a "party" to the controversy
within the meaning of Section 10(k).5
1. Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
2. Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 158(b) of this title, the
Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of
which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after
notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to
the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon meth-
ods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the
parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary
adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), was passed
by Congress in 1935. The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), id.
§ 141, which was passed in 1947, substantially amended the Wagner Act. The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), id. §§ 153,
158-60, 164, 186-87, 401, which was enacted in 1959, supplemented and amended both
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. These three statutes are collectively referred to
as the National Labor Relations Act. [Hereinafter cited as Act].
3. "The term 'jurisdictional strike' means a strike against an employer, or other
concerted interference with an employers' operations, an object of which is to require
that particular work to be assigned to employees in a particular labor organization or
in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another trade, craft,
or class." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
4. The Joint Board was established in accordance with the provisions of the Plan
For Settling Jurisdictional Disputes Nationally And Locally, May 1, 1948, as amended,
April 3, 1970. [Hereinafter cited as Joint Board Agreement]. See notes 15-18 and
accompanying text, infra.
5. Prior NLRB decisions held that unless both the employer and the unions in-
volved were bound by arbitration the NLRB had jurisdiction over the strike. See, e.g.,
Carpenters Local 701, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 74 L.R.R.M. 1423 (1970); Ironworkers
Local 75, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 74 L.R.R.M. 1440 (1970); Laborers Local 113, 184
N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1970); St. Paul Typographical Union 30, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 74
L.R.R.M. 1463 (1970); Plasters Local 65, 152 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1965); IBEW, Local 26,
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Although the Plasterers decision directly affects the dispute-prone construc-
tion industry,0 its ramifications will eventually be felt throughout the entire
field of labor-management relations. This article will examine the Plasterers
court's reasoning in reversing twenty years of NLRB precedent and analyze
the decision's effect on the collective bargaining process in the construction
industry. In order to appreciate the court's reasoning in Plasterers it will be
necessary to discuss initially: (1) the various ways which a jurisdictional
strike may arise, (2) the establishment of the Joint Board, and (3) the
NLRB procedures prior to the Plasterers decision.
Jurisdictional Strikes
Jurisdictional strikes generally evolve in one of three ways. First, an em-
ployer will contract with Union A to perform a specific work assignment. Un-
ion B, which was not a party to the contract between Union A and the em-
ployer, will claim that the assigned work is not within the province of Union
A. 7 Second, an employer will contract with both Unions A and B to perform
certain work. During the course of performance, Union A will claim that it
is entitled to perform the work currently being accomplished by Union B.
This is basically a contract dispute.8 Third, during the course of a job for
which the employer has engaged more than one union, a new task will have to
be accomplished. The employer makes an affirmative award of this new work
to Union A. Union B will assert that the new job is within its domain rather
than Union A's.9 Thus, a jurisdictional strike is not a strike which is di-
rected at securing better wages or working conditions, but rather, it is one di-
rected at obtaining the work assignment. 10
147 N.L.R.B. 1498 (1964); Metal Lathers Local 68, 142 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963); Car-
penters Local 964, 141 N.L.R.B. 1138 (1963); Newspapers and Mail Delivers' Union,
141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963); Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 139 N.L.R.B. 1426 (1962);
Operating Eng'rs Local 66, 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962); Millwright Local 1102, 127
N.L.R.B. 26 (1960); Int'l Ass'n of Iron Workers, 125 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1959); Operat-
ing Eng'rs Locals 17, 17A & 17B, 99 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1952); Carpenters Local 581, 98
N.L.R.B. 346 (1952); Local 16, ILWU, 82 NL.R.B. 650 (1949); Lodge 86, IAM, 81
N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949).
6. The building and construction industry is the only industry which has estab-
lished binding arbitration procedures for the settlement of jurisdictional strikes.
7. See, e.g., Plasterers Local 65, 152 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1965); Operating Eng'rs Local
825, 139 N.L.R.B. 1426 (1962); Operating Eng'rs Local 66, 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
8. See, e.g., Plasterers Local 79 v. N.L.R.B., Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30,
1970); Metal Lathers Local 68, 142 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963); Operating Eng'rs Locals 17,
17A & 17B, 99 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Local 16, ILWU, 82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949).
10. I think the committee all agreed that those types [jurisdictional strikes] are
in effect racketeering strikes. They are strikes which are not direct strikes to
settle questions of wages or hours or better working conditions. They are
strikes which are, in effect, attempts to bring indirect pressure on third parties,
to get third parties to work in some way to bring about a result which may
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Establishment of the Joint Board
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act," the Building and Construc-
tion Trades Department of the AFL-CIO proposed a plan for the settlement of
jurisdictional strikes. 12 On May 1, 1948, various international unions and
employer associations in the construction industry entered into an agreement
which provided for binding arbitration of jurisdictional strikes. The proce-
dures outlined in this agreement established the Joint Board as arbitrator.' 3
The Joint Board is a nine member board composed of an impartial chair-
man, four representatives of labor, and four representatives of signatory con-
tractor-employers. 14 Any labor organization which is a signatory of the
Joint Board Agreement may file a protest against a work assignment.' 5 The
signatory contractor-employer is directed to make work assignments in ac-
cordance with the "agreements and decisions" contained in the "Green
Book,"' 6 and to continue those assignments pending the Joint Board deter-
mination of the jurisdictional strike.1 7
Since all contractor-employers are not signatories of the Joint Board Agree-
ment, an employer involved in a jurisdictional dispute may be in any one of
four different positions. First, he may be a member of a contractors' asso-
ciation which is signatory of the Joint Board Agreement. An employer in
this situation is bound by a Joint Board determination' 8 and such a decision
ultimately be favorable to the one initiating the pressure, which has no direct
relation to the work except perhaps with regard to the question of power.
93 CONG. REC. 3838 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
11. The Taft-Hartley Act provided quick remedies to supplant the effects of juris-
dictional strikes. Section 8(b)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1964), outlawed
all jurisdictional strikes except where an employer failed to conform to an NLRB
order or certification, Section 10(1) empowers a regional officer of the NLRB to
petition the federal district court where the jurisdictional strike occurred for injunctive
relief when there is reasonable cause to believe that Section 8(b)(4)(D) has been
violated.
12. Joint Board Agreement.
13. Id., art. III, § 4 which states that "[it shall be the duty of the Joint Board
to consider and decide cases of jurisdictional disputes in the building and construction
industry. ...."
14. Id., art. II, § 1.
15. PROCEDURAL RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL JOINT BOARD FOR SETTLE-
MENT OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES, Oct. 20, 1949, as amended, April 17, 1968,
[hereinafter cited as PROCEDURAL RULES] Union's Responsibility, No. 3.
16. Joint Board Agreement, art. VI, § 1. The Joint Board Agreement and the
decisions and agreements of record are all embodied in one volume referred to as the
"Green Book."
17. The Joint Board Agreement also provides for appeals in certain circumstances to
the Appeals Board, and establishes various procedures to be followed in enforcing a
Joint Board or Appeals Board award. Id., art. II, § 2.
18. In signing this stipulation, the undersigned agrees to be bound by the terms
and provisions of the agreement effective May 1, 1948, as amended by agree-
ment effective October 1, 1949 . . . . [Tihe undersigned agrees to be bound
by the provision of the agreement which states: 'any decision or interpretation
19701
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can be enforced by either the Joint Board' 9 or the courts.2 0  Second, an
employer may be completely neutral. A neutral employer is eager to have
the dispute resolved and is willing to abide by any decision. Third, the em-
ployer may be neither a signatory of the Joint Board Agreement nor a mem-
ber of a contractors' association which is a signatory of the Agreement.
Fourth, the employer may be a member of a contractors' association which is
not a signatory of the Joint Board Agreement. In each of these last two situ-
ations the employer may be directly affected by any determination made with
respect to the disputed work. However, an employer in either of these posi-
tions is precluded from intervening in the Joint Board proceeding. 21 This
article is concerned with these last two situations.
The abstention provision of Section 10(k) prevents the NLRB from hold-
ing a hearing when all the parties have agreed to resolve their jurisdictional
differences by arbitration. Thus, when the unions and the employer are
signatories of the Joint Board Agreement, the NLRB may not hold a Section
10(k) hearing. The effect of the Plasterers decision, however, is to deny the
concerned non-signatory employer any voice in an arbitration proceeding
which, as a practical matter, will be binding on him.
NLRB Procedure
The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the establishment of the Joint Board
did not completely solve the problem of jurisdictional strikes, since not all
unions and employers in the construction industry were signatories of the
Joint Board Agreement. When a jurisdictional strike involved these non-
signatory groups, the NLRB would determine the merits of the controversy.
Prior to the Plasterers decision the NLRB's procedures for resolving jurisdic-
tional strikes were simple and equitable. The NLRB would hold a Section
10(k) hearing only when the parties, i.e., employers and unions, were neither
by the joint [sic] Board (or Hearing Panel) shall immediately be accepted
and complied with by all parties signatory to this agreement.'
PROCEDURAL RULES, § 1.
19. Id. § E(d), Compliance Procedure. This section directs the appropriate con-
tractors' association to use its authority and influence to force a contractor member
to comply with a Joint Board decision.
20. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
21. Joint Board Agreement, art. II, § 1; art. IH, § l(a). These two sections
should be read together. They provide that only signaturies to the Joint Board Agree-
ment are to be considered as members thereof, and that only "participating or stipu-
lated employer national associations" may designate a representative to participate
in resolution of a jurisdictional dispute. Notwithstanding these provisions, this author
understands that on some occasions nonmember contractors are allowed to partici-
pate in the Joint Board proceedings. However, the criteria used for allowing such par-
ticipation are nowhere established.
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bound, nor desirous of being bound, by arbitration procedures. 22
In Lodge 1743, IAM,23 the NLRB stated the criteria it would follow
when making an affirmative award in a Section 10(k) hearing.
The Board will consider all relevant factors in determining who is
entitled to the work in dispute, e.g., the skills and work involved,
certifications by the Board, company and industry practice, agree-
ments between unions and between employers and unions, awards
of arbitrators, joint boards, and the AFL-CIO in the same or re-
lated cases, the assignment made by the employer, and the effi-
cient operation of the employer's business. 24
The unions involved were bound by a Section 10(k) award since this
award would establish the basis of an unfair labor practice if the losing union
reverted to picketing 25 or failed to notify the Regional Director that it would
abide by the decision. 26 The employer, however, does not commit an unfair
labor practice if he refuses to abide by the award. The Plasterers court deter-
mined that this fact, i.e., that the employer did not commit an unfair labor
practice by refusing to abide by a Section 10(k) award, had controlling sig-
nificance.
The Plasterers Decision
The controversy involved in Plasterers developed in the early 1950's between
the Plasterers and the Tile Setters Unions. Prior to 1950, it was necessary to
set new tile in a wet plaster bed. The application of this wet plaster bed was
the work of the Tile Setters. During the mid-1950's a new method was de-
vised for the setting of tile. This new method made it possible to set tile di-
rectly on a dry coat of plaster. The Tile Setters asserted that they alone
should prepare this smooth plaster surface. The Plasterers contended that the
Tile Setters were only entitled to apply their setting bed and not the smooth,
dry plaster surface. This controversy culminated in a jurisdictional strike2 7
22. See note 5, supra.
23. 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962). These criteria were established subsequent to the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212,
[CBS], 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
24. Lodge 1743, IAM, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410-11 (1962).
25. The Board's finding that a union had violated Section 8(b)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(D) (1964), without first holding a Section 10(k) hearing was affirmed
in NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 410 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1969). "We cannot believe
that Congress intended to require a Section 10(k) proceeding after a binding voluntary
settlement of a dispute when the legislative scheme provides for the discontinuance of
a Section 10(k) proceeding if such an adjustment shall occur during its pendency."
Id. at 9.
26. The Board has always required the losing union to notify the appropriate Re-
gional Director whether it will refrain from forcing the employer to assign work to it.
Failure to do so will result in an unfair labor practice charge being filed against the
union.
27. The jurisdictional strike was of the second type discussed at note 10, supra.
1970]
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The dispute was submitted to the Joint Board which awarded the work in dis-
pute to the Plasterers. The Tile Setters refused to abide by this award and
continued to perform the disputed work. This resulted in the Plasterers
picketing two job sites where Tile Setters were employed. This unsettled
controversy caused the NLRB to hold a Section 10(k) hearing.
Since the non-signatory employers involved were not bound by the Joint
Board award and had not participated in the Joint Board determination, the
NLRB "rejected the Plasterers contention that the hearing should be quashed
because the unions had agreed on a method for voluntary settlement."' 28 The
NLRB subsequently awarded the work to the Tile Setters. After the Plasterers
refused to abide by this award, the NLRB held that the Plasterers committed
an unfair labor practice, 29 which the Plasterers appealed to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.30
The question presented to the D.C. Circuit was one of first impression.A
This question was "whether it was error for the [NLRB] to have conducted
a 10(k) hearing after being timely advised that both unions had agreed to be
bound by the decisions of the National Joint Board."'3 2 Its resolution was
predicated on the court's interpretation of the term "parties" in Section 10(k).
In holding that the non-signatory employer was not a party to a jurisdic-
tional strike, Judge Leventhal writing for the majority examined dicta from
various Supreme Court cases3 3 and the "refusal of Congress to bind the em-
28. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
29. The alleged unfair labor practice was a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D); 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1964). This section states that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ...
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce . . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise,
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services; or ... to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in any industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is ...forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or
certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for em-
ployees performing such work ....
30. "Since there is no independent review of Section 10(k) work assignments, the
only stage at which the [union] can contest the work award is on review of the Section
8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice order. If the Section 10(k) order fails, the unfair
labor practice order falls with it." NLRB v. Local 991, ILA, 332 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.
1964).
31. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
32. Id.
33. The principal cases relied on were Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); NLRB
v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212 [CBS], 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
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ployer to the Board's determination of a jurisdictional strike. '3 4  The ma-
jority found guidance in the Supreme Court dicta in NLRB v. Radio and
Television Broadcast Engineers Union [CBS],3 5 which stated that "a juris-
dictional dispute . . is a dispute between two or more groups of employees
over which is entitled to do certain work for an employer.13 6 The majority
also examined the legislative history of Section 10(k) and stated "[t]hat
history forcefully supports the conclusion that Congress intended in Section
10(k) to encourage disputing unions to establish inter-union machinery for
settling jurisdictional disputes and to afford them an opportunity to exhaust
this machinery." 37  The majority in Plasterers concluded that the statutory
scheme, the legislative history, and the Supreme Court dicta required the in-
terpretation of the term "parties" to include only the unions involved in the
jurisdictional strike.
Judge MacKinnon dissented from the majority on two of its three conclu-
sions. He agreed that anon-signatory employer was not a party to a jurisdic-
tional dispute, but concluded that such an employer became a "party" when
the unions involved him in a jurisdictional strike under Section 8 (b) (4) (D).38
The dissent pointed out that the majority's use of congressional statements was
not helpful since they referred to the original House version of Section 10(k)
and not the later version that was subsequently enacted.39 The dissent did not
address itself to the fact that a non-signatory employer does not commit an un-
fair labor practice by refusing to abide by a Section 10(k) award.
The majority and dissent disagree on whether the non-signatory em-
ployer has standing to participate in a jurisdictional strike. While the ma-
jority holds that Congress intended that the non-signatory employer could
never be a party to a Section 10(k) hearing, the dissent concludes that Con-
gress did intend the non-signatory employer to be a participant when the
unions involved him in the jurisdictional dispute.
Although neither the majority nor the dissent thoroughly analyzed the non-
neutral employer's position, both would exclude the non-neutral employer
from participating in any determination of a jurisdictional strike if the unions
did not involve him.
34. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
35. 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
36. Id. at 579.
37. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
38. Id. The dissent attempts to distinguish between jurisdictional disputes and
jurisdictional strikes. Judge MacKinnon states that a jurisdictional dispute is a dis-
pute solely between two unions which does not involve the employer in any man-
ner. He further states that a jurisdictional strike causes the employer to become in-
volved in the union's dispute by picketing or other force exerted on the employer.
39. Id.
1970]
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Analysis of Plasterers
The Plasterers court's reliance on the Supreme Court dicta in NLRB v. Radio
and Television Broadcast Engineers Union [CBS] is misplaced. The ques-
tion presented in CBS was whether following a Section 10(k) hearing the
NLRB should make an affirmative award of the disputed work. Since the
Columbia Broadcasting Company was completely neutral with respect to
which union performed the work, the Supreme Court did not analyze the em-
ployer's position. Therefore, CBS does not stand for the proposition that a
non-signatory employer is not a party to a jurisdictional dispute.40
Throughout the congressional hearings and debates on Section 10(k), ref-
erence was made to the employer as the "innocent victim" of the jurisdictional
strike. 41 The employer was characterized as being neutral and willing to
award the work in dispute to either union, or in some instances to both
unions.42 Admittedly, Congress did not consider the non-neutral employer,
i.e., one who consciously awards employment to one union rather than to
another for reasons of cost, efficiency, or quality production, in drafting
Section 10(k). Viewed in this context, the conclusions derived from the
legislative history by the majority in Plasterers are correct but incomplete.
The question presented, therefore, is how the term "parties" should be inter-
preted when the jurisdictional strike involves a non-neutral employer. This
question may be resolved in one of two ways. First, Section 10(k) can be
considered in relation to other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Second,
the accurateness of a restrictive interpretation of the term "parties" can be
determined by analyzing the effects that such an interpretation will have on a
non-neutral employer.
40. In CBS the Columbia Broadcasting Company had assigned the lighting work
for a hotel telecast to the Theatrical Union, Local 1. When the protesting of the
Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212 against this work assign-
ment proved unsuccessful, they refused to operate the cameras for the program there-
by forcing its cancellation. The question of remote lighting, which caused the dis-
pute, had extended over a number of years. The Columbia Broadcasting Company was
completely neutral with respect to which union performed the work. Consequently,
the employers position was not relevant to the Court's determination.
For a general discussion of jurisdictional strikes prior to the CBS decision see
Garmer & Powers, The Role of the National Labor Relations Board In Resolving Juris-
dictional Disputes, 46 VA. L. REV. 660 (1960).
41. "The provisions protect employees more than they do the employers, although
obviously employers often are innocent victims, the secondary victims, so to speak, of
such practices." 93 CONG. REc. 5014 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball). "Conse-
quently, there have been numerous jurisdictional disputes in which the employer is
entirely innocent and yet he and the public have been made to suffer ....... id.
at 4288 (remarks of Senator Smith). When Congress was considering this legislation,
there were a number of unresolved jurisdictional strikes. Id. at 4131-32 (remarks of
Senator Ellender). President Truman directed Congress to adopt legislation which
would settle these existing strikes and prevent future strikes from occurring. Id. at 136.
42. 93 CONG. REC. 3227-8 (1947) (remarks of Mr. Lucas).
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Taft-Hartley: Sections 8 and 10(k)
The Plasterers court determined that the paramount purpose of the Taft-
Hartley Act was to protect only neutral employers. 43 Since the Taft-Hartley
Act defines certain practices of unions to be unfair labor practices, 44 an em-
ployer involved in some of the various situations in Section 8(b), such as
featherbedding, cannot be classified as a "neutral employer. '45  The Taft-
Hartley Act gives the non-neutral employer an opportunity to protect his in-
terests, either directly through his own initiative or indirectly through the
NLRB. Such an employer is given the right to file unfair labor practice
charges,46 petition the NLRB for an election, 47 or file suit in federal court
for injuries sustained as a result of a union's unfair labor practice.48 In each
of these situations the employer has a definite interest in the outcome of the
dispute.
The statements of Senator Morse49 and the minority views expressed in the
Senate Report on the Taft-Hartley Act,5 0 are characteristic of the effect de-
sired by Congress of Section 10(k). Although Congress expected that unions
would establish machinery within their own organizations to resolve jurisdic-
tional strikes, the exclusion of interested employers from these proceedings
43. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964).
45. Section 8(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (6) (1964), states that:
[I]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent[s]-
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or
deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for
services which are not performed or not to be performed ....
An employer who is subjected to featherbedding practices is interested and concerned
in curtailing these practices and their deleterious effects upon him. "I am against
requiring an employer to submit to other featherbedding practices, thereby running up
the cost of his product for the consuming public to pay." 93 CONG. REC. 3641 (1947)
(remarks of Mr. Keating).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
47. Id. § 159(c)(1)(B).
48. Id. §§ 185(a),(b).
49. [P]robably one of the greatest benefits that will come from the adoption of
such amendments to the Wagner Act as I am proposing this afternoon will be
action on the part of the unions themselves to see to it that it does not be-
come necessary, unless in exceptional cases, to resort to the machinery which I
have proposed in these amendments ...because the unions themselves will
proceed to establish within their own organizations machinery capable of set-
tling such disputes short of economic action.
93 CONG. REC. 1845 (1947) (remarks of Senator Morse).
50. Section 10(k) in effect provides for compulsory arbitration of jurisdictional
disputes . . . . We believe this provision of the bill to be sound, and are
pleased to note that full opportunity is given to parties to reach a voluntary
accommodation without governmental intervention if they so desire. We
are confident that the mere threat of governmental action will have a bene-
ficial effect in stimulating labor organizations to set up appropriate machinery
for the settlement of such controversies within their own ranks, where they
properly should be settled.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 18 (1947).
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was not necessarily anticipated. The Joint Board recognized this fact and pro-
vided that employer representatives participate in jurisdictional determina-
tions.51 The Joint Board further recognized that any signatory employer who
was directly affected by a jurisdictional strike should have an opportunity to
present his case and protect his interests.52
Congress was as perceptive as the ALF-CIO in attempting to protect the
employer's interest. Although "Congress just did not address themselves to
the point" 53 of non-neutral employers, it did provide, through the term "par-
ties," the aggrieved non-neutral employer with a forum to protect his in-
terests.
Section 10(k) states that:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of sec-
tion 158(b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to
hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor prac-
tice shall have arisen . . .54
Section 8(b)(4)(D) states that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
force an employer to assign work to one union rather than another. The usual
force exerted by a union during a jurisdictional strike is picketing. There are,
however, other means that unions can employ to pressure an employer. One
method is to have the unions agree between themselves which will perform
certain work for an employer. Thus, not only picketing but also any force
exerted on the employer which precludes him from awarding employment
to one union rather than another involves him in a jurisdictional strike.
The term "person" as used in Section 10(k) is defined in Section 2(1) 55
which states that: "The term 'person' includes one or more individuals, labor
organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." 56 The use of the term "per-
son" in Section 10(k) undeniably refers to labor unions, since no other cate-
gory delineated in Section 2(1) can violate Section 8(b)(4)(D). In enact-
ing Section 10(k) Congress did not direct the NLRB to hear and determine
jurisdictional strikes between the "persons" involved, but rather between
the "parties" involved.
51. Joint Board Agreement, art. II, §1.
52. "It shall be the duty of the Joint Board to consider and decide cases of juris-
dictional disputes in the building and construction industry, which disputes are re-
ferred to it by ... any employer directly affected by the dispute ....... id., art.
III, § 4.
53. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
55. Id. § 152(1).
56. Id,
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Words and phrases which were to be given special meaning in the Taft-
Hartley Act were explicitly defined by Congress. Since Congress did not
specifically define the term "parties," it should be accorded its normal in-
terpretation, i.e., "[t]he persons who take part in the performance of any
act, or who are directly interested in any affair . . . ." Since the non-neu-
tral employer is directly affected by the work assignment, an interpretation
of the term "parties" which excludes the non-neutral employer is inconsistent
with the purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act, i.e., to protect employers from de-
vastating labor tactics. 58
The Plasterers court isolated Section 10(k) in its interpretative analysis.
The court looked only to Section 8 (a) 5 9 to inquire whether an employer who
refused to abide by a Section 10(k) award committed an unfair labor prac-
tice. The court correctly concluded that he did not. The lack of provisions
for enforcement by the NLRB led to the majority's restrictive interpretation of
the term "parties." The court, therefore, rejected the NLRB's interpretation
since it believed that a Section 10(k) award could not be enforced against
a non-neutral, non-signatory employer. The court, however, did not con-
sider the relationship between Sections 10(k) and 301 of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act. 0
Taft-Hartley: Sections 10(k) and 301
The Plasterers court considered only the original House version of Section
10(k), from which the present law is derived. The court, however, did not
consider the effect of the modified version of Section 10(k) that was
enacted into law. Under the original House version, Section 10(k) au-
thorized the NLRB to appoint an arbitrator who would determine the merits
of a jurisdictional strike. 61 The award of this arbitrator was to have the effect
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964). For a contrary view see Sussmen, Section 10(k):
Mandate for Change?, 47 B.U.L. REV. 201 (1967); Cohen, The NLRB and Section
10(k): A Study of the Reluctant Dragon, 14 LAB. L.J. 905 (1963); O'Donoghue, Juris-
dictional Disputes in the Construction Industry Since CBS, 52 GEo. L.J. 314 (1964).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
60. Id. § 185.
61. The original House version of Section 10(k) stated that:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 8(b), the Board is
empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such
unfair labor practice shall have arisen or to appoint an arbitrator to hear
and determine such dispute, unless within 10 days after notice that such
charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satis-
factory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for volun-
tary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute
with the decision of the Board or the arbitrator appointed by the Board or
upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dis-
missed.
H.R. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1126 (1947).
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of an NLRB order.6 2 When this provision was subsequently deleted, Sena-
tors Morse and Murry strongly objected because the effect of this deletion
was to interject the NLRB as the arbitrator of jurisdictional strikes.63
Prior to the enactment of Section 301, enforcement of arbitration provi-
sions in labor contracts was generally controlled by either common law or
state statutes. At common law an executory agreement to arbitrate could be
revoked prior to the rendering of an award.64 The party who breached the
arbitration agreement was liable for damages, but the agreement could not
be specifically enforced. 5 However, once arbitration pursuant to an agree-
ment had been completed, the parties to the agreement were legally bound by
the decision. 66  The United States Arbitration Act6 7 made a distinction be-
tween commercial and labor controversies. This Act allowed federal courts to
enforce executory agreements to arbitrate in commercial disputes while
specifically excluding employment contracts.68 Because of this exclusion
courts had not applied the Arbitration Act to union contract cases.69
The enactment of Section 301 in 1947 significanctly changed the law
with respect to arbitration of labor disputes. Section 301 gave the federal
courts the power to: (1) enforce union contracts, 70 (2) compel arbitration
proceedings in accordance with the contract terms,71 (3) entertain suits in-
volving awards issued under the arbitration clauses of such contracts, 72 and
(4) specifically enforce the award. 73
The Plasterers majority concluded that a non-signatory employer could not
be a party to a Section 10(k) proceeding since he was not legally bound by
the award. The language of Section 10(k) reveals, however, that the law im-
plies a provision for resolution of jurisdictional strikes in every labor contract.
The NLRB has jurisdiction to determine the merits of a jurisdictional strike
unless the "parties" have provided for other means of settlement. Thus, the
62. Id.
63. 93 CONG. REc. 6452 (1947) (remarks of Senator Morse); id. at 6506 (remarks
of Senator Murray).
64. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
65. id.
66. Id.
67. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). "[Blut nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Warehouse Workers Local 19 v. Buckeye Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th
Cir. 1956); Elec. Workers Union v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954);
Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. Elec. Workers Local 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953); Mercury
Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
71. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 335 U.S. 448 (1957).
72. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
73. Id.
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NLRB has jurisdiction to determine every jurisdictional strike by the lan-
juage of Section 10(k). It can only relinquish this jurisdiction if the "par-
ties" have agreed on a private method of determination. Unions and em-
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74. Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, Civil No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1970).
75. PROCEDURAL RULES § 7(a).
76. Lodge 1743, IAM, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410-11 (1962).
77. Joint Board Agreement, art. III, § 4. NLRB v. Local 25, IBEW, 396 F.2d
591 (2d Cir. 1968). rhe court stated that "It appears that this Joint Board gives little
weight to considerations of economy, and that past practice is usually held determina-
tive." Id. at 594.
78. JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN AFFILIATED INTERNA-
TIONAL UNIONS & DECISIONS RENDERED AFFECTING THE BUILDING INDUSTRY THAT
ARE HELD TO BE OPERATIVE BY THE BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEP'T.
79. Id. at 15-77.
80. Id. at 78-148.
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These decisions range in dates from May 1904 through January 1968, with
over half coming before 1924.81 The "established trade practice" or "pre-
vailing practice in the locality" are spurious standards since both of these cri-
teria have evolved within the boundaries of the appropriate agreements or
decisions. In reality, therefore, the Joint Board resolves jurisdictional dis-
putes by using standards that are approximately 40 years old, although the
methods and materials used in the construction industry have advanced during
this time span. A signatory employer may award a work assignment to a
particular union because: (1) it may have more expertise with a particular
method or material, or (2) it may have sufficient expertise to adequately
perform the work, but accepts a lower wage scale. This employer, however,
may be precluded from making this work assignment by an agreement which
may be 68 years old. s2
Thus, the situation of the employer who is a signatory of the Joint Board
Agreement, either directly, or indirectly through a contractors' association, is
not an enviable one. However, the position of the employer who is not a
signatory of the Joint Board Agreement is even less enviable.
Usually, non-signatory employers sign separate contracts with individual
labor organizations for the performance of work assignments. However, a
non-signatory employer who signs contracts with signatory unions is denied
the opportunity for meaningful participation in the arbitration process.83
This employer is either precluded from or unwilling to submit to a Joint
Board determination. Consequently, the arbitration provisions of his con-
tracts are rendered hollow. Placed in this position an arbitrator would de-
clare the issue between the employer and either union non-arbitrable8 4 based
on the lack of participation of both unions in the proceeding.85 The ar-
bitrator would then adjourn the hearing pending the Joint Board determina-
tion. The arbitrator would reconvene the proceeding after the Joint Board
had issued its award to determine, on the basis of the award, whether the em-
ployer had complied with his contract.8 6 Thus, the arbitration provisions have
lost their value to the non-signatory employer.
The court in Plasterers determined that a non-signatory employer who de-
81. Id.
82. In Plumbers Local 55, 184 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 74 L.R.R.M. 1678 (1970), the
Joint Board issued an award to the plumbers based on a 1926 agreement. The NLRB
reversed the Joint Board for its failure to explain the factors relied on in making the
award. The mere existence of a 1926 agreement was not determinative.
83. Jones, Autobiography of a Decision: The Function of Innovation in Labor
Arbitration, and the National Steel Orders of Joinder and Interpleader, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 938 (1963).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1022.
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clines or is denied the opportunity to participate in a Joint Board proceeding
is not legally bound by the award. However, the circumstances in the building
and construction industry are such that a non-signatory employer is bound, as a
practical matter, by a Joint Board award. Admittedly, an employer who is
not a party to an arbitration proceeding is not legally bound by the decision.
In Retail Clerks Local 770 v. Thriftmart, Inc.,8 7 Chief Judge Traynor held
that due process prohibits enforcement of an arbitration award against a non-
participating party. 88 Judge Traynor quoted with approval Retail Clerks
Local 428 v. L. Bloom Sons Co.,89 which stated that:
Appellant is, in effect, urging the patently absurd proposition that
two parties can by contract effectively stipulate for the mode of de-
termination of the rights of a third party who has not only not as-
sented to such a mode of determination but who also is not even ac-
corded an opportunity to participate in such determination.9"
A non-participating employer's options must be carefully analyzed to deter-
mine the practical effect of this award. The employer may not offer the
disputed work to the losing union, for the victorious union could have its
award specifically enforced. The employer could solicit other unions to per-
form the disputed task, if they had the requisite expertise. This, however,
would only result in another Joint Board or Section 10(k) proceeding. 91
Eventually the employer would be forced to deal with the victorious union.
92
87. 59 Cal. 2d 421, 380 P.2d 652, 30 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1963).
88. Id. at 423-24, .380 P.2d at 655-56, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
89. 173 Cal. App. 2d 701, 344 P.2d 51 (1959).
90. Id. at 703, 344 P.2d at 52-53. See also Beinstein, Nudging and Shoving All Par-
ties to a Jurisdictional Dispute into Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of National
Steel, 78 HARV. L. REV. 784 (1965). Mr. Bernstein emphasizes the importance of both
parties to an arbitration proceeding agreeing on the choice of an arbitrator. He disagrees
with Mr. Jones, see note 86, supra, because the effect of a motion in the nature of inter-
pleader in an arbitration hearing would be to force a party to participate in the pro-
ceeding without assenting to the selection of the arbitrator. The court in Plasterers has
gone one step further. The court does not allow the employer to select the arbi-
trator, or to participate in the proceedings. The court states that voluntary arbitration
procedures should not be frustrated simply because of employer non-participation.
Conversely, voluntary arbitration procedures, which are geared to the protection of only
the unions involved, should not be allowed to render an award without employer par-
ticipation, which will, as a practical matter, be binding on the employer. The em-
ployers interests must be protected by someone. If the employer and the unions can
not agree on the choice of an arbitrator, the courts should not choose one for them.
This is the function of the legislature and it has performed this function by appointing
the NLRB as arbitrator.
91. The determination of a jurisdictional dispute is only applicable to the two
unions who are signatories of the Joint Board Agreement. Thus, disputes are deter-
mined on a case by case basis, unless a national decision is requested and decided in
accordance with article III, Section 2 of the Joint Board Agreement.
92. It is conceivable that an employer would eventually be able to deal with a
union that he favors even though it lost. The employer would have to repeatedly offer
the disputed work to unions he selected until one was accepted by the Joint Board.
The time involved in this, however, could be prohibitive.
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The employer could attempt to contract non-union employees to perform the
disputed work. However, of the more than three million men employed in
the construction industry in the United States, only 65 thousand are not un-
ion members. 93 Therefore, as a practical matter, the employer is bound by a
Joint Board arbitration award-an inequitable and unsatisfactory result.
Since the criteria employed by the Joint Board excludes considerations of
economy and efficiency, non-neutral employers prefer NLRB determina-
tions.94 Under the rule pronounced by the NLRB 20 years ago this em-
ployer would have a forum in which to present his case and have it deter-
mined fairly. However, if a non-neutral employer was dissatisfied with an
NLRB award, his options would be exactly the same as under a Joint Board
award, i.e., none. The only difference is that the employer has a right to
be present during the NLRB hearing9" while he is precluded from participating
in the Joint Board hearing. Thus, the jurisdictional controversy was settled
fairly, with all the parties being afforded an opportunity for active participa-
tion, thereby accomplishing the Act's purpose. 96
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,97 stated
that: "As labor organization grew in strength and developed toward ma-
turity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the nascent labor
movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and to administra-
tive techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes."98 Congress,
in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, stated that one of its purposes was ". . . to
provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by
[employees and employers] with the legitimate rights of the other . . .99
The decision in Plasterers is not consistent with either statement. It was not
the intent of Congress to allow the Joint Board, using antiquated and biased
criteria, to dictate employment practices to contractor-employers. Nor is
93. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, July, 1969, BULL. No.
1630. This statistic was arrived at by comparing Tables 36 and 136.
94. Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 111, 1200-01
(1968).
95. The employer would also be able to petition an appropriate court for judicial
review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d), 558(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1964) states that:
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with
the full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided
or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations
each recognize under law one another's legitimate rights .... It is the pur-
pose and policy of this Act, . . . to prescribe the legitimate rights of both em-
ployees and employers in their relations affecting commerce . . ..
97. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
98. Id. at 251.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1964).
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it consistent with the principles of due process to deny an employer, whose
rights may be adversely affected, an opportunity to participate in the deter-
mination of a jurisdictional dispute. And it is contrary to the interests of the
public to frustrate arbitration methods or collective bargaining processes of
settling jurisdictional strikes. Yet, these are the effects of the Plasterers deci-
sion,100 through which the D.C. Circuit, by judicial fiat, has appointed an ar-
bitrator for the non-signatory employer contrary to his desires and has sub-
stituted the powers of the Joint Board for those of the courts in enforcing arbi-
tration awards. The ramifications of this decision in the field of labor-man-
agement relations are such that they alone would warrant re-appriasal of the
decision. For until other equitable provisions and criteria are adopted by
the Joint Board, the NLRB is the only forum which provides the procedural
safeguards for a just and final determination of a jurisdictional strike.' 0 '
Arthur M. Brewer
100. Another problem presented by this decision is the effect produced on NLRB
certification. It is conceivable that the Joint Board could render a decision which
conflicts with an NLRB certification, although construction unions are rarely certified.
The courts would then be presented with the problem of determining which decision to
enforce, i.e., either the NLRB's certification of a union through an appropriate bar-
gaining unit or the Joint Board's award which could destroy the appropriateness of
the bargaining unit.
101. The NLRB recently considered the holding announced in Plasterers and re-
jected it. Local 1982, Acoustical Workers, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1970).
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